Abstract. We introduce a nonconvex Mean Field Games system by studying a model with a large number of identical pairs of players who are all rational, and each pair plays an identical zero-sum differential game. We study existence and uniqueness of solutions for a simple system in this context.
1. Introduction 1.1. Heuristic derivation. Mean Field Games were introduced independently by Caines, Huang, Malhamé [11, 12] and Lasry, Lions [13, 14, 15 ] to study systems with large numbers of identical agents in competition. In the competition, each agent is rational and seek to optimize a value (payoff) functional by choosing appropriate controls. The interactions between them are given by a mean field coupling term that aggregates their individual contributions. We then let the number of agents tend to infinity and take the average to obtain a mean field limit, in which we observe the distribution of the agents as a probability measure. A typical Mean in T n × (0, T ),
u(x, 0) = u 0 (x), m(x, T ) = m T (x) on T n .
Here T > 0, ε ≥ 0 are given parameters, and T n = R n /Z n is the n-dimensional torus. The first equation, a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman type equation, is forward in time and associated with an optimal control problem, and the unknown u = u(x, t) is the value (payoff) function of an average agent. The second equation, a FokkerPlanck equation, is backward in time and the unknown m = m(x, t) describes the density (distribution) of the agents. For each fixed t ∈ [0, T ], m(·, t) is a probability measure. In this context, the Hamiltonian H = H(x, p) : T n × R n → R is assumed to be convex in p because of the optimal control framework. The coupling term F (x, m) : T n × P(T n ) → R encodes the interactions between each agent and the mean field. Here P(T n ) is the set of all Radon probability measures on T n . In the lecture notes of Cardaliaguet [4] , and Gomes, Pimentel, Voskanyan [8] , the time direction in (MFG) is reversed. To go from this setting to theirs, we simply set u(
(1.1)
A quick and heuristic way in [4, 8] to derive (1.1) is the following. An average agent controls a stochastic differential equation
where B t is a standard Brownian motion. He/she aims at minimizing the value functional
Here the Lagrangian L = L(x, q) : T n × R n → R is the Legendre transform of H. It is important noting that F plays a role in this minimizing problem.
The value functional of an average agent is then given by the first equation in (1.1). Heuristically, his/her optimal control is given in a feedback form by α * (x, t) = −D p H(x, Du). As all agents are rational, they all move with a velocity which is due to both the diffusion and the drift term −D p H(x, Du), which leads to the second equation in (1.1).
We also refer the readers to the surveys of Guéant, Lasry, Lions [7] and Gomes, Saúde [9] for further discussions on (MFG) and applications.
1.2. Nonconvex Mean Field Games. We give a heuristic derivation here in case ε = 0. For now, let us just assume that F (x, m) : T n × P(T n ) → R is nice enough. We consider a large number of identical pairs of players who are all rational, and each pair plays an identical zero-sum differential game. In each pair, player I aims at maximizing while player II aims at minimizing a certain payoff functional by controlling the dynamics of a particle in T n , which represents the location of the pair in the game.
Fix T > 0. Let A, B be two compact metric spaces. For t ∈ [0, T ), let
be the set of possible controls in time [t, T ] of players I and II, respectively. We henceforth identify any two controls which agree a.e. Assume that the dynamics is given by an ordinary differential equation
for given controls a(·) ∈ A t of player I, and b(·) ∈ B t of player II. Here, f :
n is a given vector field satisfying: there exists C > 0 such that
Under the conditions on f , (ODE) has a unique solution. Associated with (ODE) is the payoff functional
where h : T n × A × B → R is a given function satisfying: there exists C > 0 so that
The interpretation is that h is the running payoff and u 0 is the terminal payoff. For this generic pair of players, at time s, their only knowledge of the whole world is the distribution of other agent represented by the density m(s). At location y x (s) and with the knowledge of the density m(s), player I gains a further payoff value F (y x (s), m(s)). Of course, the goal of player I is to maximize the payoff functional C x,t (a(·), b(·)). On the other hand, player II wants to minimize it (or to maximize −C x,t (a(·), b(·))). One way to interpret this situation is that generic player I prefers to be close to other pairs to gain more value, while generic player II prefer to avoid the crowds. The set of strategies for player I beginning at time t is
where non-anticipating means that, for all
Similarly, the set of strategies for player II beginning at time t is
We call
the lower value and the upper values of the game, respectively. Let
be the lower and upper Hamiltonians of the game, respectively. It was shown by Evans, Souganidis [6] that, V is the viscosity solution to the lower Hamilton-JacobiIsaacs equation
and U is the viscosity solution to the upper Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation
Since H − ≥ H + , we get V ≤ U by using the comparison principle. Assume further that the zero-sum differential game has a value, that is, H − = H + . This means we assume that
(1.2) Once (1.2) holds, then we have
Thus, U = V solves the first equation in (1.1). Heuristically, for (x, t) ∈ T n × (0, T ), the optimal strategies of the pair is given by (a
) (see Cardaliaguet [3] ). As all players are rational, all pairs move with a velocity due to the drift term −D p H(x, Du), which gives us the second equation in (1.1). We thus obtain (1.1), hence (MFG), with H not convex in p.
1.3.
A simple system -A case study. Our main focus in this paper is the following system, which is a simplified version of the full system (MFG),
Here, the coupling term F (x, m) = ρ * (ρ * m) is very simple and is of nonlocal type. We assume the following conditions (A1) The Hamiltonian H : R n → R is smooth and there exists c 0 > 0 such that
Organization of the paper. Our main goal here is to study existence and uniqueness of solutions to (1.3). In Section 2, we prove that there exist solutions to (1.3).
In Section 3, we show that, under some additional conditions, we have uniqueness results for (1.3).
Notations. We use the following notations
Existence of solutions
The main result in this section is
Proof. For each m ∈ X, there exists a unique solution,
Thanks to Proposition 2.2 below, we have that
Let m be the solution to the Fokker-Planck equation
In light of the maximum principle, m ∈ X. Define the map Φ : X → X as Φ(m) = m.
where U is the solution of (2.1). The a priori estimate (2.
Multiply this PDE by v k and integrate on T n to get
We employ Gronwall's inequality to yield further that, for t ∈ [0, T ],
Fix a sequence {m k } ⊂ X. As U k satisfies estimate (2.3) for all k ∈ N, we also have that (U k ) t L ∞ (T n ×[0,T ]) ≤ C for some constant C > 0 independent of k. We use the Arzelà-Ascoli theorem to extract a subsequence {U k j } of {U k } such that
Repeat the argument in Claim 1 to deduce that {Φ(m k j )} is a Cauchy sequence in X. Therefore, K is compact. We use Claims 1,2 and Schauder's fixed point theorem to conclude that, there exists m ∈ K such that Φ(m) = m. Proposition 2.2. Assume that (A1)-(A3) hold. Let U be the solution to (2.1) with m ∈ X given. There exists C > 0 depends only on c 0 , M, T, u 0
Proof. Let f = ρ * (ρ * m). It is straightforward to see that
Fix (x 0 , t 0 ) ∈ T n × (0, T ]. We use the nonlinear adjoint method to prove (2.3). See Evans [5] , Tran [18] , Cagnetti, Gomes, Mitake, Tran [2] , Gomes, Pimentel, Voskanyan [8] , Mitake, Tran [17] and the references therein for the development of this method.
Consider the adjoint equation to the linearized operator of (2.1):
It is clear that σ > 0 in T n × (0, t 0 ) and T n σ(x, t) dx = 1 for all t ∈ [0, t 0 ]. Differentiate (2.1) with respect to x i , multiply by σ and integrate to yield that
Hence,
. Differentiate (2.1) with respect to x i , multiply by U x i and sum over i to get
Multiply the above by σ and integrate to imply
(2.6) Next, we differentiate (2.1) with respect to x i then x j ,
Multiply this identity by σ, integrate and use (A1), (A3), (2.6) to conclude that
Remark 1. The arguments in the proof of the existence result (Theorem 2.1) are quite standard and not new. A similar form of the proof already appeared in [8, Section 10.2] . In [8] , Gomes, Pimentel and Voskanyan used the convexity of H to achieve the uniform semiconcavity estimate of U k , which was then used to get Claim 2 (the compactness of K = Φ(X)). The main difference here is that we do not require convexity of H, and estimate (2.3) is obtained thanks to the appearance of the diffusion term and the nonlinear adjoint method.
Uniqueness of solutions
We obtain uniqueness of solutions to (1.3) in this section. As H is not necessarily convex, it is much harder to perform this task. We add the following assumption (A4) The constant c 0 , which appears in (A1), satisfies
,
Note first that M ≥ 1 as m T ≥ 0 and T n m T (x) dx = 1. Hence,
Assumption (A4) is like a smallness condition, which is quite restrictive but nevertheless quantitative. Note further that the smallness of c 0 does not depend on T , and thus, there is no restriction on T > 0. See Ambrose [1] for related results.
Here is one of the main results in this section.
Proof. Let (u 1 , m 1 ) and (u 2 , m 2 ) be two pairs of solutions in
and
Take the difference of first equations of (3.2) and (3.3) and use (A1) to get
Multiply this by m 2 and integrate on T n to yield
A similar computation gives
Combine the two above inequalities and use (A2), (A3) to imply
Thus,
(3.4) Next, we take the difference of first equations of (3.2) and (3.3), multiply by 2(u 1 − u 2 ) and integrate to imply
where we use Cauchy-Schwarz's inequality in the last line. Besides,
We continue by taking the difference of the second equations of (3.2) and (3.3), multiply by 2(m 1 − m 2 ) and integrate
Note that Cauchy-Schwarz's inequality is used in the last line of the above computation. Note further that T n (m 1 − m 2 ) dx = 0. Hence, Poincaré's inequality gives
Combine this with the previous computation, we arrive at
Multiply (3.5) by 1 4 , combine the result with (3.4) and (3.6) to get that
We use (A4) and (3.1) to get further that Remark 2. Condition (A4) is quite restrictive as it requires that both DH L ∞ (R n ) and D 2 H L ∞ (R n ) are small enough (smaller than c 0 ). In particular, if M = max T n m T is sufficiently large, then Theorem 3.1 gives the uniqueness result in a perturbative regime only. This is of course not so satisfying. To some extend, this is related to the result of Ambrose [1] .
The monotonicity of ϕ(t) is interesting in its own right. See [10, Section 6] for some related discussions.
We provide next another uniqueness result, where the appearance of a constant drift is allowed. Theorem 3.2. Let b ∈ R n be a fixed vector, and K : R n → R be a smooth function such that (A1)-(A4) hold with K in place of H. Define H : R n → R as
Then (1.3) has at most one pair of solution (u, m) ∈ C
It is clear that this uniqueness result is stronger that that in Theorem 3.1. We choose to present the two results separately to emphasize an important point that there are some good cancelations corresponding to the constant drift term.
Proof. The proof is basically the same as that of Theorem 3.1 except the fact that we need to handle the drift term b · p in a careful manner. We cannot just use brute force bounds here. Let us provide the computations related to these terms here.
The first term we need to take care of is
